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Domestic developments 
A new government took office in the Republic of  
Moldova in late May 2013 after a prolonged and 
difficult series of  political crises led to the break-
up of  the previous coalition government. At that 
crucial juncture in its history, Moldova’s pros-
pects of  living up to its designation as a “success 
story” within the framework of  the EU’s Eastern 
Partnership policy were rapidly evaporating. Pub-
lic trust in the country’s pro-European govern-
ment plummeted to a point where its revival 
appeared doubtful. The Communist opposition, 
which had fared well in the polls, demanded new 
elections and launched a “velvet revolution” to 
overthrow the government and take Moldova into 
a Russia-led Customs Union.
In the aftermath of  the crisis, the leaders of  
the pro-European coalition have succeeded in 
rising above their personal ambitions to lock 
in Moldova’s movement toward the European 
Union. Despite ever-stronger challenges crea-
ted by stiff  competition between European and 
Eurasian integration and the significant deterio-
ration of  the security situation in the region, the 
new government has restored political stability 
to focus on Moldova’s key strategic priorities: 
do mestic reforms and its European agenda. 
The newfound style of  moderation and coopera-
tion among Moldovan leaders has greatly dimini-
shed conflicts between coalition parties, although 
it is not clear to what extent this cooperation will 
be maintained in the run-up to the elections this 
November, when coalition parties will increas-
ingly become competitors rather than partners. 
The country’s improved economic situation has 
helped, with overall GDP growth registering 
almost 9 percent last year. Tangible progress was 
achieved recently in fighting corruption in the 
justice system. Virtually for the first time in the 
history of  independent Moldova, judges—once a 
caste that could not be touched—are now sacked 
and brought to trial for wrongdoing.
Public trust in the current government and its key 
project, European integration, was partly restored 
with the resolution of  the country’s constitutional 
and coalition crises. Recent opinion polls indicate 
that a majority of  the public has now regained 
some confidence in the government led by Prime 
Minister Iurie Leanca. The Communist party, 
whose support rates towered after the coalition cri-
sis erupted last summer despite the fact that it has 
no credible development program of  its own, has 
fallen behind pro-European parties in the polls.
Moldova initialed the association agreement with 
the EU in November 2013 and gained a visa-free 
regime with the EU in April 2014. It was the 
first of  the Eastern Partnership countries to do 
so. Although this decision was in part intended 
to signal political support from the EU, it only 
became possible after Moldova had fulfilled all 
criteria and fully and implemented the visa liber-
alization action plan with the EU in a timely way. 
The association agreement is slated to be signed 
in late June.
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The Republic of  Moldova initialed its association agreement with the EU in November 2013 
and plans to sign it this June. In April 2014 it became the first of  the Eastern Partnership 
countries to establish a visa-free regime with the EU. The current government’s key strategic prio-
rities remain domestic reforms and its European agenda. But it faces increasing pressure both at 
home and abroad with only six months left until the next elections. Because so much hangs in the 
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Heightening tensions 
Moldova’s choice to firmly pursue a European 
integration agenda has increased tensions at 
home and pressure from abroad. The leadership 
of  the separatist Transnistrian region has started 
to call for a “civilized divorce” from the rest of  
the country, and tensions with the region have 
increased over a range of  issues. These include 
the presence Moldovan police in the city of  Ben-
der, which is located on the right bank of  the 
Dniester river but is under de-facto Transnistrian 
regional control; access of  Moldovan farmers to 
lands under Transnistrian control; and the status 
and existence of  schools in the province that 
teach Romanian in the Latin alphabet. In Febru-
ary, the leadership of  the autonomous region of  
Gagauzia—leaning heavily toward Russia—orga-
nized a “referendum” on Moldova’s integration 
with the Eurasian Union. Russia, meanwhile, 
ba nned imports of  all Moldovan wine in the 
autumn. After the Gagauzia “referendum,” Rus-
sia lifted the ban on wines from that region only. 
Unofficially, it was hinted that there would be 
economic repercussions for Moldova if  it pur-
sued its European integration agenda. The Com-
munist party openly advocated an overthrow of  
the pro-European government on the grounds 
that its plans to sign the association agreement 
amounted to “high treason.”
Domestically, public opinion is largely split on 
the matter of  whether to enter into an associ-
ation agreement with the EU or join the Cus-
toms Union. European integration enjoys more 
support, but only by a slender margin. At the 
same time, opinion polls suggest that fundamen-
tal support for the EU’s development model 
and European values remains strong. Even the 
Communist party—whose leader has equated 
the EU with “Nazi Germany”—has nonetheless 
hailed the virtues of  European integration while 
arguing that EU integration can best be ac hieved 
through Eurasian integration. It is the slow pace 
of  reforms and economic uncertainty—not 
the European idea as such—that make people 
hesitant.
Opinion polls also suggest that popular support 
for the Customs Union, where it exists, boils 
down to three fundamental factors: a) a desire 
for cheaper gas prices, b) the fear of  conflicts 
and economic repercussions coming from Russia 
(encouraged by an aggressive and distorting anti-
EU propaganda campaign), and c) the country’s 
lack of  a clear EU membership perspective. 
Opponents of  European integration have one 
particularly powerful argument: While Moldova 
would be welcome in the Customs Union and 
the Eurasian Union, the gate to EU membership 
would remain closed forever.
Geopolitical environment
Within the broader regional context, Moldova 
has increasingly become a subject of  geopolitical 
competition between Eurasian and European 
integration. This is not a role it has chosen for 
itself. A strong and credible EU development 
model is of  existential importance to the country. 
Without it, Moldova is destined to a future of  fai-
lure and limbo, prey to changing geopolitical cir-
cumstances, caught between Russia and the Euro-
pean Union in a gray zone where each successive 
government redefines the rules of  the game.
The EU’s Eastern Partnership was designed at 
a time when there was no alternative model of  
integration in Eastern Europe. It responded to 
Eastern Europe’s aspirations rather than being 
based on the proactive pursuit of  the EU’s own 
interests in the region. The offers of  the Eastern 
Partnership have proven ill-equipped to respond 
to emerging competition from the Russian-led 
Customs Union. The EU offers largely mid- to 
long-term benefits (through institution building, 
reforms, and democratic transformation) but few 
immediate short-term perks. The Customs Union, 
on the other hand, promises immediate benefits 
if  it is joined or costs if  it is rejected. In the mid 
and long term, however, it spells deadlock.
The EU’s most far-reaching integration offer, 
the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA), was inevitably bound from the begin-
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ning to trigger opposition from Russia. By subs-
tantially integrating Eastern European countries 
into the EU single market, it will move them 
away from close proximity to Russia’s own eco-
nomic standards and structures, a transformation 
that puts them on a different development track. 
As a consequence, not only the economic but 
also the political links between the EU and East-
ern Europe can be expected to develop fast. 
While the EU maintains that its Eastern Partner-
ship policy offers a track that is distinct from EU 
accession, there is no real difference from the 
Russian perspective between Eastern Partnership 
and EU enlargement. Here, DCFTA marks the 
decisive step. To prevent DCFTA from becoming 
a cause of  conflict, the EU and Russia would 
have had to agree on creating a shared free trade 
area. But they failed to do so. As a consequence, 
the question was never whether the conflict would 
escalate, but rather how far it would escalate.
At first glance, the resulting tension—which 
has taken such a tragic turn in Ukraine—is an 
increas ingly geopolitical contest that threatens the 
security of  Eastern Europe. On a deeper level, 
it is a struggle for the modernization of  Eastern 
Europe, where the current social and economic 
situations are untenable. As the countries of  
Eastern Europe lack any alternative model of  
development, European integration is vital for 
their long-term survival. If  they remain in limbo 
between East and West, their economic and social 
situations will further deteriorate and, with it, 
threaten the stability and security of  the region 
as a whole. Uncertainty about the region’s future 
development lies at the heart of  the current cri-
sis. The core problems of  the crisis can only be 
removed when this uncertainty is removed. For 
the Republic of  Moldova, this means that it has 
no choice but to opt for the EU. 
For the overwhelming majority of  the political 
forces in Moldova, the decision to integrate with 
Europe is not a choice against Russia but a neces-
sary decision to modernize the country. Moldova 
is and will remain a neutral country; no major 
political force in the country has questioned this 
principle. It is an asset to reassure Russian secu-
rity interests.
However—and most crucially—any effort to 
reconcile conflicting interests on the subject of  
EU integration would require Moldova to draw 
back from the association agreement. Doing so 
would be tantamount to sacrificing the country’s 
long-term survival and national interest for a 
temporary de-escalation of  tensions.
The way forward 
In the current contest, Moldova faces a steep 
uphill battle. Several years ago it was run by an 
authoritarian regime. The country was adrift, 
with no clear sense of  purpose or direction and 
no understanding of  how to tackle its chronic 
problems. Many of  these problems persist, but 
within three years, Moldova has opened up to 
the outside world in unprecedented ways. For the 
first time in Moldova’s independent history, the 
country has chosen a clear development model 
for itself: the EU model. 
Historical challenges are considerable, however. 
These include corruption, an underdeveloped 
economy, conflict in the Transnistrian region, 
and controversies regarding Gagauz autonomy. 
The Communist party threatens to turn Moldova 
back. With elections scheduled for November—
just five months after the association agreement 
is signed in June—much hinges on the next few 
months. If  the country’s economy and security 
suffer in the immediate run-up to the elections, 
pro-European parties could well be hurt. Voters 
may feel that closer association with the West has 
brought costs rather than benefits. If  pro-Euro-
pean parties lose power this autumn, there is a 
substantial risk that Moldova could revert to what 
it was before the EU integration project started: a 
gray zone caught between West and East run by a 
semi-authoritarian regime.
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What should this mean for the EU’s Moldova 
policy? Other then NATO membership, the 
West, and in particular the EU, should not seek 
to compromise the prospect of  Moldova’s EU 
integration rather, the EU should rather increase 
its commitment with respect to the resources it 
employs and the perspectives it offers. Even if  
it is questionable if  the membership perspective 
would be a strong incentive for reforms, it is now 
the crucial commitment that the EU can arti-
culate to stabilize the region and convince Mol-
dovans that they can confidently look ahead to a 
brighter future.
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